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THE DISADVANTAGED PLAINTIFF: IS IT TIME
TO REVISIT THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19761 ("FSIA") provides
the exclusive means for attaining jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign and
its agencies and instrumentalities in U.S. courts.2 The FSIA provides
qualified foreign states a presumption of immunity from jurisdiction,
attachment, and execution. From these blanket rules of immunity, the
FSIA establishes limited exceptions based on a restrictive theory of
immunity that can subject foreign states to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
for claims arising out of commercial conduct.4
Unfortunately, the FSIA has been exploited by foreign sovereigns
seeking to avoid liability for almost all conduct.5 In the thirty years since
its enactment, foreign sovereigns have increasingly utilized discrete
corporate structures to conduct their commercial affairs.6 Despite their
commercial characteristics and legally distinct personalities, these

' Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2

See id (codifying sovereign immunity law in United States); see also Argentine Republic

v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989) ("[T]he FSIA provides the sole basis
for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of [the United States].")
' See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1611 (explaining immunity protections provided to qualified foreign
states); see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann 541 U.S. 677, 726 (2004) (discussing initial
presumption of immunity under FSIA).
4 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (explaining
restrictive theory of immunity and its history in U.S. jurisprudence). The restrictive theory of
immunity permits suits arising out of a sovereign's commercial conduct. Id; see also Peterson v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3 d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing statutory construction
of FSIA); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605
(stating first objective of FSIA's enactment was codifying restrictive principles of sovereign
immunity).
5 See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 624
(1983) (claiming sovereign immunity to avoid liability for government expropriation of assets);
De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1984) (claiming sovereign
immunity to avoid liability for act of state terrorism); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 720 F. Supp.
2d 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y 2010) (claiming sovereign immunity to avoid liability for defaulted
sovereign bonds), vacated on othergrounds sub nom., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la
Repuiblica Arg., 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011).
6 See FirstNat 'l
City Bank, 462 U.S. at 624 (discussing foreign sovereigns' increasing use of
corporate form and its utility to modem governments).
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corporations enjoy a presumption of immunity under the FSIA. 7 By
attaching the presumption of immunity to their commercial corporations,
foreign sovereigns may extend sovereign immunity to their commercial
counterparts while limiting their liability for commercial acts. 8
This Note addresses the confusion in the courts with respect to
when a legally separate corporate entity should be considered an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state and discusses the inequitable effects that
result from the broad presumption of immunity afforded to qualified
corporate entities. 9 Part II traces the evolution of sovereign immunity in
the United States, from its origin at common law to its statutory
codification in the FSIA.' 0 Furthermore, Part III explores the current legal
framework for adjudicating claims against foreign sovereigns and the
presumption of immunity the FSIA affords qualified corporate entities."
Additionally, it explores the procedural disadvantages for plaintiffs
resulting from the FSIA's presumption of immunity as well as the
structural contradiction that allows corporate defendants to enjoy sovereign
characteristics for the purpose of jurisdictional immunity, while retaining a
presumption of legal separateness for the purpose of limited liability. 2
Finally, Part IV of this Note discusses several reform proposals that would
restore the balance between parties and simplify the rules governing
liability of foreign corporations and their parent governments. 13
II.

HISTORY

A. Background
The Sovereign Immunities Doctrine is derived from the English

7 See Phillip Riblet, A Legal Regime for State-Owned Companies in the Modern Era, 18 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (2008) (observing sophistication of modem state owned

corporations); see also Larry Cati Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global
Regulation ofSovereign Wealth Funds, State -Owned Enterprises,and the Chinese Experience, 19
TRANSNAT'LL. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 61 (2010) (discussing how state-owned entities no longer

"merely the outward projection of state power"). Today's state-owned enterprises have evolved
into major players in the international financial and commercial marketplace. See Backer, supra,
at 61 (noting changed aspects of state-owned enterprises).
8 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing foreign sovereign use of legally separate entities
to structure commercial acts and limit liability).
See infra Part III.A-B.
'o See infra Part II.

' See infra Part 111.
12 See infra Part III.B.
13 See infra Part IV.
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common-law concept that "the king can do no wrong.' 14 The theory of
absolute sovereign immunity that came to dominate Eighteenth and15
Nineteenth Century United States jurisprudence is based on this concept.
Absolute sovereign immunity is based on the theory that sovereign states
should not be subject to suit in U.S. courts absent consent. 16 The Supreme
Court affirmed absolute sovereign immunity in the seminal case of The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.7
The Schooner Exchange Court
considered whether the particular circumstances entitled a French naval
vessel to immunity from suit in U.S. courts.' 8 In an opinion written by
Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court held that the principles of "perfect
equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and [a] common interest
impelling them to mutual intercourse" dictated that armed public vessels
were immune from jurisdiction.' 9 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall
posited that certain exceptions to the rule of absolute immunity might exist
in situations where the sovereign had engaged in commercial conduct.2 0

14

See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (discussing

origins of doctrine of sovereign immunity). The Court reasoned that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity flowed from the universal implied consent of nations. Id.; see also Verlinden B.V. v.
Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (stating sovereign immunity is "a matter of
grace and comity"); H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6606 (recognizing absolute sovereign immunity was a doctrine of international law). Generally,
the rationale for sovereign immunity was to avoid adjudication that might offend a foreign nation
or frustrate the executive branch in its international dealings. See Jane H. Griggs, Note,
InternationalLaw The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Do Tiered Corporate Subsidiaries
ConstituteForeign States?, 20 W. NEwENG. L. REv. 387, 389 nil (1998) (discussing traditional
rationale behind U.S. courts' adoption of absolute immunity). Over time, the rationale for
extending sovereign immunity has evolved to focus on the importance of promoting comity and
observing the customs of international law. Id.
15 See Troy Daniels, An Analysis of the UnitedStates Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 4 J.
INT'L L. & PRAC. 175, 176 (1995) (describing doctrine of absolute immunity and history of
sovereign immunity in United States).
16 See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857) ("It is an established principle
of jurisprudence in all civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in
any other, without its consent and permission .... ).
17 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812) (holding U.S. courts could not exercise jurisdiction
over armed naval vessel of foreign sovereign).
1s See id. at 118 (explaining facts of case).
The Schooner Exchange, a commercial vessel
originally owned by U.S. citizens, was seized by Napoleon Bonaparte. Id. at 117. The Exchange
was then armed and re-commissioned as a public vessel by the French government. Id. at 117-18.
While taking safe harbor in the U.S. port of Philadelphia due to foul weather, plaintiffs arrested
and detained the vessel pursuant to process of attachment, claiming the vessel was illegally seized
and that the U.S. had jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 118-19.
19 See id. at 137, 147.
20 See id. at 142 (discussing distinction between public and private acts of state). Chief
Justice Marshall explained that the Court's ruling should only be applicable to armed ships of
war, suggesting that the distinction between armed ships of war and commercial vessels might
warrant disparate treatment in cases of immunity. Id. at 144.
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In Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Bank of the United States v.
Planters' Bank of Georgia,2 ' the Court invoked one of these exceptions,
holding that state-owned corporations were not necessarily entitled to
sovereign immunity. 22 In Planters' Bank, the Court reasoned that when the

State of Georgia incorporated its bank, the bank became a separate legal
identity and, thus, voluntarily waived its right to invoke the privileges of
sovereign immunity. 23 Although the Court's decision did not rely on the
commercial activity concept initially discussed in the Schooner Exchange,
the application of the "separate legal entity" rule in24the sovereign context
theoretically limited the reach of absolute immunity.
However, due in part to the Court not addressing the application
and limitation of the separate entity rule nor elaborating further on the
commercial activities exception presented in The Schooner Exchange, the
theory of absolute immunity prevailed in the lower courts for the better part
26
of a century.25 Indeed, in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro,
the Supreme
Court explicitly endorsed the theory of absolute immunity.2 7 The Court
stated that the Pesaro, a commercial vessel owned and operated by the
Italian government and engaged in wholly commercial activities, should

enjoy the same immunity as an armed ship of war, such as the Schooner

Without indicating any opinion on this question, it may safely be
affirmed, that there is a manifest distinction between the private property of
the person who happens to be a prince, and that military force which
supports the sovereign power, and maintains the dignity and the
independence of a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a
foreign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that property to
the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered as so far laying down the
prince, and assuming the character of a private individual.
Id.at 145.
21 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
22 See id.
at 907-08 (holding government engaged in trade takes the character of the business
of which it transacts).
23 See id.("The State of Georgia, by giving to the Bank the capacity to sue and be sued,
voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the Bank,
and waives all the privileges of that character.").
24 See William C. Hoffman, The Separate Entity Rule in InternationalPerspective: Should
State Ownership of Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign Status for Immunity Purposes?, 65 TUL.
L. REv. 535, 543-44 (1991) (discussing history of separate entity rule and impact on absolute
immunity doctrine).
25 See Note, Too Sovereign to Be Sued- Immunity of Central Banks in Times of Financial
Crisis, 124 HARv. L. REv. 550, 554 (2010) (discussing United States courts' adherence to
absolute immunity theory).
26 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
27 See id.at 574 (holding public ships immune from jurisdiction in United States courts
regardless of nature of conduct).

2012]

FOREIGNSO VEREIGN IMMUNITIES A CT

Exchange. 28 The Pesaro Court held that sovereign governments should be
immune from suit in U.S. courts irrespective of the nature of their
activities, thus eroding any commercial activity exception envisioned by
Chief Justice Marshall a century earlier in Schooner Exchange.29
While the absolute immunity theory prevailed, the "separate entity
rule" applied in Planters' Bank seemed to endure alongside it, creating
significant confusion and contradiction among the courts.30 This confusion
was compounded by the fact that the courts viewed sovereign immunity as
a matter of national interest best left to the executive branch because of a
decision's potential impact on international relations.3 ' Accordingly, when
confronted with questions of sovereign immunity, the courts deferred to
"suggestions" issued by the executive branch in accordance with the unique
diplomatic objectives presented in the case. 32 In effect, these executive
suggestions were binding on the court.33
Initially, the executive branch issued suggestions in accordance

28

See id. at 569-74 (reasoning government owned commercial vessels served similar public

purpose as ships of war).
29 See id. at 574.
The decision in The Exchange therefore cannot be taken as excluding
merchant ships held and used by a government from the principles there
announced. On the contrary, if such ships come within those principles,
they must be held to have the same immunity as war ships ....
We think the principles are applicable alike to all ships held and used
by a government for a public purpose, and that when, for the purpose of
advancing the trade of its people or providing revenue for its treasury, a
government acquires, mans, and operates ships in the carrying trade, they are
public ships in the same sense that war ships are.
Id.
3

See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 542-43 (discussing development of separate entity rule as

balance to absolute immunity).
31 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882) (stating questions of immunity required
judicial branch to follow actions of political branch). The Court regarded the political branch as
best suited to resolve questions of immunity because "the decisions of which, as they might
involve war or peace, must be primarily dealt with by those departments of the government which
had the power to adjust them by negotiation, or to enforce the rights of the citizen by war." Id.
32 See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 32-34 (1945) (discussing need for judicial
deference to the executive branch in cases involving foreign relations); see also Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (addressing need to avoid embarrassing political
branch by assuming antagonistic jurisdiction); Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima,
S.A.,v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938) (reasoning courts must decline jurisdiction in cases
where executive branch recognizes immunity).
33 See William A. Dobrovir, A Gloss on the Tate Letter's Restrictive Theory of Sovereign
Immunity, 54 VA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968) (discussing conclusive effect given by courts to
"suggestions of immunity" issued by executive branch).
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with the absolute theory of immunity.34 However, the United States began
to retreat from the absolute theory of immunity in the case of the Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman,35 where the Supreme Court held that a sovereign
vessel, operated by a privately-owned Mexican company engaged in

commercial activities, was not entitled to immunity from suit.3 6 The Court
held that no clear policy or common law precedent existed for affording
immunity to a sovereign based on title alone.3 7 Furthermore, the Court

stated that the State Department's refusal to certify immunity for the
Mexican government-owned vessel was indicative of a "national policy"
against affording immunity based on title.38 The Court's holding shifted
the focus of sovereign immunity from legal title to possession and nature of
conduct, thus signaling a shift towards a restrictive theory of foreign
sovereign immunity, which
permits suits arising out of a foreign state's
39
activities.
commercial
The Hoffman Court's adoption of the restrictive theory was
officially endorsed in a 1952 letter from State Department Advisor Jack
Tate (the "Tate Letter") .40 Despite the fact that the Tate Letter signaled a
distinct policy shift, the executive branch's determinations and suggestions
with respect to sovereign immunity essentially remained political and often
inconsistent with the rationale of the restrictive theory espoused in the Tate
Letter. 4i In recognition of these inconsistencies and the inequitable effects

14 See Clinton L. Narver, Putting the "Sovereign" Back in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: The Casefor a Time of Filing Testfor Agency or Instrumentality Status, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J.
163, 168 (2001) (discussing executive branch's adherence to principles of absolute immunity
prior to enactment of FSIA); see also Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 42 (holding courts should not deny
immunity where government has certified foreign defendant's petition).
"5 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
36 See id. at 37-38 (holding where State Department declined to certify immunity, stateowned vessel not entitled immunity); see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1,
11 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing historical shift from absolute immunity to restrictive theory). The
Court suggests that the retreat from absolute immunity, in favor of the restrictive theory,
developed in response to the rise of Communism and the increasing presence of government and
government-owned corporate entities in international commerce. Id.
17 See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 38 ("We can only conclude that it is the national policy not
to
extend the immunity in the manner now suggested, and that it is the duty of the courts, in a matter
so intimately associated with our foreign policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to
enlarge an immunity to an extent which the government... has not seen fit to recognize.").
3s See id. at 36-38 (discussing the impact of the State Department's refusal to certify
immunity).
'9 See id. at 38 (noting absent precedent for immunity based on title, courts looked to
possession and conduct).
40 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, to
Acting Attorney General, The Tate Letter (May 1952), reprintedin Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976).
41 See Narver, supra note 34, at 169 (noting political influence on sovereign immunity
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of the judiciary's exposure to diplomatic influences, Congress enacted the
FSIA to "transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the
executive branch to the judicial branch . . . [to] assur[e] litigants that
these ... decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures

that insure due process.

42

B. The FSIA
In the House Report on the matter, Congress cited four objectives
that it designed the FSIA to remedy. 43 The first objective was to codify a
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity that would limit immunity to only
suits involving a foreign state's public acts, and providing no such
protection for suits based on the commercial or private acts of states 4. 4 The
second objective was to ensure that these restrictive principles were applied
in litigation before United States courts with the goal of making uniform
and consistent decisions based strictly on legal grounds and without
interference from diplomatic or political pressures. 45 The third objective
was to provide a statutory procedure for serving process and obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state. 46 Finally, the fourth objective was to

matters).
42 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606
(explaining Congress's objectives in enacting FSIA). Congress believed that by transferring
immunity decisions to the courts, "[t]he Department of State would be freed from pressures from
foreign governments to recognize their immunity from suit and from any adverse consequences
resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support that immunity." Id. Similarly,
Congress acknowledged the inequity that occurred prior to the enactment of the FSIA, where
private parties dealing with a foreign government entity could not "be certain that his legal
dispute with a foreign state [would] not be decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations
through the foreign government's intercession with the Department of State." Id.at 9, reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6607.
43 See id.at 7, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605 ("The bill ...[will] accomplish four
objectives.").
44 See id.
(describing restrictive principle of sovereign immunity and making its codification
primary objective of FSIA).
45 See id.at 7-8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605-06 (discussing objectives to be
realized with enactment of FSIA).
46 See id.at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606 (discussing need for statutory
procedure for service of process and exercising jurisdiction). Prior to enactment of the FSIA,
litigants were required to seize and attach the property of a foreign sovereign in order to obtain
jurisdiction See id.at 26-27, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6625-26 (explaining rationale
for prohibiting attachment for purpose of obtaining jurisdiction). Under its current construction,
the FSIA realizes Congress's goal by merging personal jurisdiction with subject matter
jurisdiction where service of process is proper. Id; see also Joseph F. Morrissey, Simplifying the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: If a Sovereign Acts Like a Private Party, Treat It Like One, 5
CHI. J. INT'L L. 675, 677-78 (2005) (noting subject matter jurisdiction with service of process
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction).
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47

empower judgment creditors with rights of execution.
While the FSIA has helped to add clarity to the law and provide
certainty with respect to specific areas previously prone to judicial conflict,
the FSIA has also caused much confusion and its application can lead to
inequitable results.48 In particular, the FSIA's definition of "foreign state"
has entitled a broad group of legally separate entities with a presumption of
immunity that is at odds with the separate entity rule .4 9 This presumption

of immunity provides sovereign defendants with a number of advantages
that are not available to other market participants.50
Similarly, the
presumption of immunity allows state-owned companies to enjoy dual
identities under the FSIA: one of sovereign characteristics with the benefit
of jurisdictional immunity,
and another of legal separateness with the
51
liability.
limited
of
benefit
1. The Presumption of Immunity
The FSIA defines the foreign state to include the sovereign's

47 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606 (showing

Congress's intent to provide plaintiffs with statutory mechanism for enforcing judgments). Prior
to enactment of the FSIA, the restrictive principles of sovereign immunity were applied only to
jurisdictional immunity, while foreign states enjoyed absolute immunity from execution. Id.
This left successful litigants without a remedy to enforce their judgments and ensure the
satisfaction of their judgments in the court system. Id.
48 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 2 (noting confusion experienced by courts confronted
with
questions involving agency and instrumentality status); see also De Letelier v. Republic of Chile,
748 F.2d 790, 792 (2d Cir. 1984) (expressing regret that current structure of FSIA can leave
litigants a "right without a remedy").
49 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 550 (addressing effect of FSIA and presumption of
immunity on separate entity rule). Prior to enactment of the FSIA, "the courts failed to develop a
uniform standard for the exceptional case in which a separate entity enjoys immunity." Id. Some
courts relied solely on incorporation as grounds for denying immunity, disregarding the nature or
purpose of an entity's acts. See Bank of the U.S. v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
904, 908 (1824) (holding incorporation of state bank established a voluntary waiver of sovereign
immunity). Other courts applied a restrictive theory by looking at the purpose or nature of the
act. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1964) (comparing application of "purpose test" with "nature of act" test).
Congress sought to resolve this disharmony by enacting the FSIA, which sacrificed the separate
entity rule in favor of a presumption of immunity to all state owned entities. See Hoffman, supra
note 24 at 550-51 (discussing presumption of immunity afforded to state owned entities under
FSIA).
50 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 571-74 (illustrating procedural advantages available to
foreign sovereign and agencies); see also infra Part III.B (discussing plaintiffs disadvantage
when litigating against foreign sovereign).
51 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 21 (discussing dual protections of both corporate separateness
and immunity).
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political subdivision and its agencies and instrumentalities.52
This
definition allows foreign entities to avail themselves of the same immunity
protections afforded to the sovereign state itself under the FSIA.53 For the
purposes of the FSIA,an "agency or instrumentality" is any separate legal
entity which can be properly viewed as either an organ of the foreign state
("organ status") or other such entity in which the foreign
state owns a
4
majority ownership interest ("majority ownership test").1
Of this two-pronged approach, courts have often relied on the
majority ownership test for determining agency/instrumentality status.55
Although majority ownership appears to be a relatively straightforward
inquiry, the analysis is complicated when state ownership is tiered between
intermediary agencies, whereby the state relies not on a showing of direct
ownership but instead on the equity interests of another entity of whom the
foreign state is the direct owner.56 In Dole Food Co. v.Patrickson,57
however, the Supreme Court held that a foreign state itself must maintain a
direct majority share in the corporation to qualify as an agency or
instrumentality of the state and avail itself of the immunity afforded under
the FSIA.58
52

28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1976).
(a) A "foreign state", except as used in section 1608 of this title, includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state as defined in subsection (b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof ....

Id.
53 See id.This extension of immunity is based on Congress's recognition of the growing use

of independent government agencies in carrying out the public functions of state governments.
See H.R. REP.No. 94-1487, at 6 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605 (recognizing
American citizens increasingly coming into contact with foreign states and state-owned entities).
54 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (defining "agency or instrumentality" under FSIA).
55 Michael A. Granne, Defining "Organ of a Foreign State" Under the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act of 1976, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 16 (2008) (discussing defendant's preference
for qualification for agency/instrumentality status under ownership requirement).
56 Id. at 17. The majority ownership criteria under the § 1603 definition of agency
or
instrumentality does not expressly foreclose on the possibility that an entity may qualify for
immunity based on a showing that the foreign state proper retains a majority interest in one of its
minority shareholders. See O'Connell Mach. Inc., v. M.V. "Americana," 734 F.2d 115, 116 (2d
Cir. 1984) (finding Italian government's "double-tiered" ownership of entity qualifies entity

under "majority ownership test").
57 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
58

See id.at 474 ( "[O]nly direct ownership of a majority of shares by the foreign state
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However, the Dole Court never addressed the organ status of the
entities at issue under the second prong of the FSIA definition.59 Instead,
the Court's opinion focused exclusively on qualification under the majority
ownership prong.60 In holding that "a foreign state must itself own a

majority of the shares of a corporation if the corporation is to be deemed an
instrumentality of the state," the Court strongly suggests an inquiry into
organ status would be irrelevant. 6 '
Nonetheless, the Court's holding in Dole has limited the reach of
sovereign immunity under the majority ownership test, and because the
opinion did not explicitly address organ status, qualifying as an "organ of
the state" under the second prong of the FSIA definition may provide
entities with an alternative basis for immunity.6 2 Unlike the majority

ownership test, no bright line test for determining organ status has emerged
in FSIA jurisprudence.63 While the legislative history suggests that
Congress intended organ status to be flexible, the examples provided in the
House Report discuss commercial entities together with independent
government agencies, which has led to confusing and conflicting treatment
in the lower courts.64
The Ninth Circuit held that in determining an entity's "organ
status," the ultimate question is "whether the entity engages in a public
satisfies the statutory requirement").
'9 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 17 (discussing impact of Dole on agency and instrumentality
status analyses).
60 See supra note 58 and accompanying text (demonstrating Dole simplified agency and
instrumentality status analyses to question of ownership and not control).
61 Dole, 538 U.S. at 480; see Allen v. Russian Fed'n., 522 F. Supp. 2d
167, 184-85 (D.D.C.
2007) (holding after Dole, agency and instrumentality analyses are based on evidence of
ownership, not control). The court stated that the petitioner's argument that Russian Federation
should qualify for immunity as an "agency or instrumentality" based on evidence of control and
not ownership was "nothing more than a frontal assault on the Supreme Court's decision in
Dole." Id; see also Riblett, supra note 7, at 17 (interpreting Dole as eliminating need for organ
status inquiry).
62 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (2006); see also Granne, supra note 55, at 16-17 (noting entities
failing to qualify for immunity under ownership requirement must rely on organ status).
61 See Granne, supra note 55, at 20-21 (explaining balancing tests courts use to
determine
organ status).
64 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6614.
As a general matter, entities which meet the definition of an 'agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state' could assume a variety of forms, including
a state trading corporation, a mining enterprise, a transport organization such
as a shipping line or airline, a steel company, a central bank, an export
association, a governmental procurement agency or a department or ministry
which acts and is suable in its own name.

2012]

FOREIGNSO VEREIGNIMJUNITIES A CT

activity on behalf of the foreign government.,

65

The United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined organ status
using a balancing test based on five relevant criteria in Supra Medical
Corp. v. McGonigle:66

(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a
national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively
supervises the entity; (3) whether the foreign state requires
the hiring of public employees and pays their salaries; (4)
whether the entity holds exclusive rights to some right in
the country; and (5) how the entity is treated under foreign
state law.67
Although many courts have interpreted Dole to limit immunity
qualification under agency and instrumentality status to a majority

ownership test, other jurisdictions recognize immunity under the organ test
and apply the "McGonigle test., 68 The Supreme Court has not yet defined
"organ of the state," but Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Powerex
Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.69 discusses a balancing test similar to
70
the McGonigle test.
65

Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 807 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd on other grounds,

Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
66 955 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
67 Id. at 379 (citing Corporacion Mexicana de Servicios Maritimos, S.A. de C.V.
v. M/T
Respect, 89 F.3d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1996)).
68 See Allen v. Russian Fed'n., 522 F. Supp. 2d 167, 184 (D.D.C. 2007) (interpreting
Dole
decision to limit immunity under agency/instrumentality status to showing of direct majority
ownership). But see Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel. Corp., 478
F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying "McGonigle test" to determine organ status); URS Corp.
v. Lebanese Co. for the Dev. & Reconstr. of Beirut Cent. Dist. SAL, 512 F. Supp. 2d. 199,
211(D.Del 2007) (applying seven-part balancing test similar to "McGonigle test" to determine
organ status).
69 551 U.S. 224 (2007).
70 Id. at 245-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (applying a balancing test to determine organ status).
Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the appeal based on a procedural technicality, ruling that the
appellate court lacked jurisdiction over the district court's decision to remand the case to state
court. Id. at 238 (majority opinion). From this decision, Justice Breyer dissented, stating:
In my view... Powerex is "an organ" of the Province of British
Columbia ....
... [It is] an entity that all apparently concede is governmental in nature....

[It] has a board of directors, all of whom are appointed by British
Columbia's government. ...
British Columbia's fiscal control statute refers to Powerex as a
'government body."' ... If Powerex earns a profit, that profit must be

...
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Nonetheless, both the ownership and organ tests serve to immunize
a broad range of entities regardless of their separate legal status. 7 ' Once an
entity has established that it qualifies for immunity as an agency or
instrumentality of a sovereign, the FSIA provides that it shall be immune
from suits in both federal and state courts, unless it has waived its
immunity or an applicable statutory exception exists. 72
Absent an
enforceable waiver, the FSIA's most noteworthy exception is the
commercial activities
exception, which is derived from the restrictive
73
theory of immunity.
2. Overcoming the Presumption of Immunity: The Commercial
Activities Exception
Although the FSIA addresses separately jurisdictional immunity

rebated directly or indirectly to British Columbia's residents....
In sum, Powerex is the kind of government entity that Congress had in
mind when it wrote the FSIA's "commercial activit[y]" provisions.
Id. at 245-48 (last alteration in original).
71 H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6613-14

(stating Congress intended FSIA's agency and instrumentality provision to include broad group
of entities).
72 See Kellerv. Central Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing
initial
burden of proof in litigation under FSIA). The party claiming FSIA immunity must establish a
prima facie case that satisfies the FSIA's definition of a foreign state; the burden then shifts to the
non-movant party to show that an exception applies. Id. While the FSIA specifically authorizes
both the explicit and implicit waiver of immunity, the federal courts have narrowly construed the
implied waiver provision and have been reluctant to find an implicit waiver of immunity absent
evidence of an unmistakable intent to do so. See Shapiro v. Republic of Bol., 930 F.2d 1013,
1017-18 (2d Cir. 1991) (narrowly interpreting implicit waiver exceptions to FSIA). In Shapiro,
the court declined to find that a sovereign nation's choice to bring a prior suit in the United States
courts with respect to a particular matter constituted an implicit waiver of immunity from
jurisdiction as to all associated claims. Id. at 1017-18. The Shapiro court looked to the
legislative history of the FSIA to support the conclusion that Congress intended to limit implicit
waivers to similarly unambiguous circumstances such as the foreign state filing a responsive
pleading and failing to raise the immunity defense. Id. at 1017; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487,
at 18, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6617 (citing three examples of implicit waivers).
With respect to implicit waivers, the courts have found such waivers in
cases where a foreign state has agreed to arbitration in another country or
where a foreign state has agreed that the law of a particular country should
govern a contract. An implicit waiver would also include a situation where
a foreign state has filed a responsive pleading in an action without raising
the defense of sovereign immunity.
Id.

73 See Note, supra note 25, at 555 (discussing derivation of commercial activities exception).
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and immunity from attachment and execution, the FSIA also provides
74
parallel "commercial activities" exceptions to both forms of immunity.
With regard to the statute's treatment of jurisdictional immunity, the
commercial activities exception makes no distinction between the foreign
state proper and its agencies and instrumentalities.75 Instead, it simply
provides that qualified foreign states will not be afforded immunity in
claims arising out of commercial acts having a satisfactory nexus to the
United States.76
However, with regard to attachment and enforcement measures, the
FSIA's commercial activities exception prescribes divergent treatments
based on the personality of the sovereign defendant.77 In particular, the
FSIA distinguishes between the property of agencies or instrumentalities
and the property of the foreign state itself.78 The property of the foreign
state itself may be attached "only when the property was used for the
commercial activity on which the claim is based., 79 On the other hand, the
property of the states' agencies and instrumentalities is subject to
attachment and execution "regardless of whether the property was used for
the activity on which the claim is based." 80
Likewise, Congress provided separate and additional protections
74 See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1605(a)

(2006) (providing exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction for
certain cases). An exception exists for cases:
[B]ased upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States ....

§ 1605(a)(2); see also id. § 1610(a)-(b) (providing exceptions to immunity from attachment and
execution). The property of the foreign state "used for a commercial activity in the United
States" and "any property in the United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
engaged in commercial activity in the United States" can be subject to attachment and execution.
§ 1610(a), (b).
75 See § 1605(a).
76 id.
77 See generally §§ 1610-1611. The FSIA addresses the property of the foreign state itself in
§ 1610(a), agencies and instrumentalities in § 1610(b), the property of the central bank, or
monetary authority in § 161 l(b)(1), and finally the property of military authority in § 1611(b)(2).
Id.
78 See § 1610(a) (addressing immunity as it pertains to property of the foreign state itself);
see § 1610(b) (addressing immunity protections afforded to property of agencies and
instrumentalities).
79 De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 798-99 (2d. Cir. 1984) (discussing FSIA's
divergent treatment of property of the foreign state itself); see also § 1610(a).
80 See § 1610(b)(2) (establishing immunity protections afforded to central bank property).
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for property held by central banks and military authorities.?' Pursuant to
§ 161 1(b)(1), absent an explicit waiver, property of a foreign central bank
or monetary authority that is "held for its own account" is immune from
attachment and execution.8 2 Section 1611 (b)(1) requires that, in addition to

satisfying the commercial activity requirement, a judgment creditor to a
central bank must establish that the property in question was not "held for
[the central bank's] own account."83 Furthermore, the special provisions of
§ 1611(b)(1) differ from the general rules of § 1610 as they relate to
foreign states and other agencies and instrumentalities in that central banks
may never waive their immunity
from pre-judgment attachment, only
84
execution.
of
aid
in
attachment
Despite its importance to the FSIA, determining what constitutes a
"commercial activity" has proved troublesome for the courts."' As one
commentator has noted, the confusion is largely due to the fact that the
statute "does not so much specify what constitutes commercial activity as
describes the analysis a court should undertake," stating that the
commercial character of an activity "shall be determined by reference to
the nature of the course of conduct . ..rather than by reference to its

81 See Note, supra note 25, at 556 (discussing special treatment of central bank property).
82

28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).

The federal courts have consistently held that funds "used to

perform functions that are normally understood to be the functions of a nation's central bank, and
are not utilized in commercial activities" are to be considered held for the central bank's own
account. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l (Overseas) Ltd. v. State Bank of Pak., 46 F. Supp. 2d
231, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 273 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2001); see Weston
Compagnie de Finance et D'Investissement, S.A. v. La Repulica del Ecuador, 823 F. Supp. 1106,
1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying central bank functions test); see also NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Banco Central de la Repiblica Arg., 652 F.3d 172, 191 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting central bank
functions test is only test ever employed by federal courts considering § 1611 (b)(1)).
83 See Olympic Chartering, S.A. v. Ministry of Indus. & Trade of Jordan, 134 F. Supp. 2d
528, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("If the funds at issue are used for central bank functions as these are
normally understood, then they are immune from attachment, even if used for commercial
purposes."); see also NML CapitalLtd., 652 F.3d at 194 ("A plaintiff, however, can rebut [the
presumption of immunity afforded to central banks] by demonstrating with specificity that the
funds are not being used for central banking functions as such functions are nonnally understood,
irrespective of their 'commercial' nature.").
84 See George Weisz, Nancy Schwarzkopf, & Mimi Panitch, Selected Issues in Sovereign
Debt Litigation, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 1, 38 (1991) (discussing statutory distinction between
waiver of immunity from post-judgment attachment and prejudgment attachment). "[A]lthough
commentators have questioned the intent of Congress, most agree that the language in section
1611(b)(1) means that foreign central banks cannot effectively waive immunity from
prejudgment attachment for property held for their own account." Id; see also Paul Lee, Central
Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 327, 376 (2003) (concluding
central bank property is immune from prejudgment attachment if "held for its own accounts").
85 See Note, supra note 25, at 555 (discussing difficulty experienced by courts in applying
commercial activities exception).
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purpose. 86

In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. , the Supreme

Court applied a simplified test for determining the commercial nature of a
defendant's conduct.88 The Court reasoned that the appropriate inquiry was
to determine if a private person could have engaged in similar conduct.89
The Court held that despite the fact that Argentina had issued bonds in
furtherance of uniquely sovereign and public purposes, the conduct
constituted commercial activity because it was of "the type .. .by which a
private party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce. -90
3. Presumption of Separateness
A separate issue that has emerged in the litigation of claims under
the FSLA relates to the question of when a foreign state may be held liable
for the acts or obligations of its legally separate agencies and
instrumentalities, or vice versa.91 In a typical scenario, a plaintiff will seek
to satisfy a judgment against a foreign state by executing upon or attaching
the assets of the state's subsidiary.9 2 However, in enacting the FSIA,
Congress clearly stated that "[t]he bill is not intended to affect the

Id. (quoting § 1603(d)).
504 U.S. 607 (1992).
88 See id.
at 617 (holding Argentina's issuance of sovereign bonds constituted "commercial
activity" within meaning of FSIA).
86
17

89 See id. at614.

90Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (6th ed. 1990)).
91 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 13 (noting importance and prevalence of questions relating to
liability in litigation under FSIA). As previously noted, the FSIA permits attachment and
execution against the property of the agencies and instrumentalities of the foreign sovereign on
much more generous terms than it does the property of foreign state proper. See supra notes 7779 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between immunity afforded to property of state
itself and its agencies and instrumentalities). In particular, it is unlikely that the state itself will
maintain property in the United States that will satisfy the requirement found in § 16 10(b) that the
property be "used for the activity giving rise
to the claim. See Am. Bar Ass'n Working Grp.,
Reforming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489, 585 (2002)
("Only in rare instances would a foreign state have property in the United States ... 'used' for the
activity giving rise to the claim."). It is more likely that the state's subsidiary will maintain such
commercial assets in the United States that are capable of satisfying this condition. See Riblett,
supra note 7, at 30-31 (discussing assets owned by state subsidiaries that may satisfy conditions
for attachment or execution). Thus, plaintiffs often seek to join the agencies and instrumentalities
of the state and attach their assets in hopes of attributing liability and extending the reach of any
potential judgment. See Lee, supra note 84, at 360 (explaining broader scope for execution
against agencies and instrumentality entices plaintiffs to join agencies or instrumentalities).
92 See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 624
(1983) (determining whether Cuba's liabilities could be attributed to legally separate entity); see
also De Letelier v.Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 798 (2d. Cir. 1984) (discussing whether
Chilean nation airline property could be attached to satisfy judgment against Chilean
government).
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substantive law of liability." 93 The general rule of liability, in which one
party can be held accountable for the acts of another, is based on a
presumption of separateness whereby a debtor will not be deemed to own
an asset simply because it owns or controls the entity that does so. 94 To
transfer the liability of one debtor to another legally distinct entity, the
judgment creditor must establish a basis for disregarding that separate legal

status.9'
The basis for disregarding a sovereign entity's presumption of legal
separateness and thus transferring liability onto the parent government or
other such parent entity is based on the "alter ego" doctrine of common-law
corporate veil piercing. 96 Courts may pierce the corporate veil under their
general authority to apply equitable principles.97 The "alter ego" theory
applies when there is such unity between two legally distinct entities that
the separateness of the corporation ceases to exist and in its place a
principal and agent relationship has taken form. 98 Accordingly, courts will
disregard the limited liability status and hold the "principal" responsible for
acts done in the name of the corporation.99
93 H.R.REP. NO. 94-1487, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610.
94 See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1944) (noting corporate form generally

acts as insulator on all claims of creditors). In Anderson, the Court stated, "Limited liability is the
rule not the exception .... Id.at 362; see Dole Food Co. v.Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475
(2003) ("A corporate parent which owns the shares of a subsidiary does not, for that reason alone,
own or have legal title to the assets of the subsidiary ....The fact that the shareholder is a
foreign state does not change the analysis."); see also George K. Foster, Collecting from
Sovereigns: The Current Legal Frameworkfor Enforcing ArbitralAwards and CourtJudgments
Against States and Their Instrumentalities,and Some Proposalsfor Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 665, 682 (2008) (discussing veil-piercing in sovereign context).
95 See FirstNat 'l
City Bank, 462 U.S. at 627-28 (invoking exception to limited liability).
96 See id. (discussing history of alter-ego doctrine and corporate veil piercing); see also
1
WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (pem. ed., rev. vol. 1999) (explaining process for invoking alter ego

doctrine).
97 See Inre Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("The concept
of 'piercing the corporate veil' is equitable in nature and courts will pierce the corporate veil 'to
achieve justice, equity, to remedy or avoid fraud or wrongdoing, or to impose a just liability."'
(quoting FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 96, § 41.20)); see also Kissun v. Humana, Inc., 479 S.E.2d
751, 752 (Ga. 1997) ("Under the alter ego doctrine, equitable principles are used to disregard the
separate and distinct legal existence possessed by a corporation.").
98 See First Nat'l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 629 ("[The alter-ego doctrine applies] where a
corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent
is created ....
");
see also FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 96, § 41.10 (discussing alter ego doctrine
generally).
99See FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 96, § 41.10 (discussing equitable remedies available to
courts). The alter ego doctrine in itself creates no cause of action nor is it a claim for substantive
relief. See Hennessey's Tavern, Inc., v.American Air Filter Co. 204 Cal. App. 3d 1351, 1359
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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The Supreme Court first addressed the alter ego doctrine in the
context of sovereign litigation in FirstNational City Bank v. Banco Parael
Comercio Exterior de Cuba °° ("Bancec"). The case involved First
National City Bank's (now Citibank) setoff rights against the Cuban
Central Bank. 1 1 Following the Cuban government's expropriation of
Citibank assets in Cuba, Citibank effected its setoff claim against a letter of
credit claim it had with the Cuban central bank. 102 The Cuban central bank
argued that its immunity and separate legal status under the FSIA should
protect it from a counterclaim arising out of the actions of its parent foreign
government. 103 The Court confirmed that the FSIA did not affect the
substantive law of liability of a foreign state or agency or
instrumentality. 0 4
Moreover, the Court stated that government
instrumentalities created as separate juridical entities should enjoy a
presumption of legal separateness. 1 5 However, the Court noted that under
the substantive law of liability, this presumption could be overcome in
certain circumstances. 0 6 Specifically, the Court identified two such
circumstances: "where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its
owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created" and where the
equitable principles dictate that recognition of the presumption of
separateness would work to avoid fraud or injustice. 107 The Court
A claim against a defendant, based on the alter ego theory, is not itself a

claim for substantive relief, e.g., breach of contract or to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance, but rather, procedural, i.e., to disregard the corporate
entity as a distinct defendant and to hold the alter ego individuals liable on
the obligations of the corporation, where the corporate form is being used by
the individuals to escape personal liability, sanction a fraud, or promote
injustice.
Id.
100 462 U.S. 611, 618-19 (1983).
101 Id. at 613 (discussing facts of case).
102 Id.
at 613-17 (discussing organizational history of Cuban banking and changes resulting
from Cuban Revolution). The Cuban central bank acquired the letter of credit claim after the
dissolution of the Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba ("Bancec"). Id. at 616.
103 Id. at 617, 619-20 (reviewing lower court holding and current posture of parties). The
district court rejected Bancec's argument that its separate juridical status shielded it from liability
for the acts of the Cuban Government. Id. at 616-17.
104 Id.
at 620 ("The language and history of the FSIA clearly establish that the Act was not
intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or
instrumentality, or the attribution of liability among instrumentalities of a foreign state.").
105 See FirstNat 'l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 624-26 (discussing nature and beneficial functions
attributed to government instrumentalities).
106 Id. at 628-29 ("[C]ourts in the United States and abroad, have recognized
that an
incorporated entity ... is not to be regarded as legally separate from its owners in all
circumstances." (footnotes omitted)).
107 Id. at 628-29.
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concluded that observing Bancec's separate legal status would cause an

injustice. 1°8
The Bancec Court makes it clear that something more than that
which is required for qualification as an agency or instrumentality is
needed to establish an alter ego argument for veil piercing under the

FSIA. 10 9 However, there is no clear test for when the alter ego doctrine is
applicable. 110 Instead, the courts have relied heavily on fact-based analyses
that are often so unique to the
case at hand that they are poorly suited for
11
disputes.
future
in
application
Nonetheless, the courts have had the opportunity to apply the alter
ego doctrine in a number of different scenarios.1 2 For example, in LNC
Investments, Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua,"3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the plaintiff's attempt to execute
against the funds of the Central Bank of Nicaragua in satisfaction of a
judgment obtained against the Government of Nicaragua on a defaulted
loan." 4 Applying the Bancec principles, the Court reviewed the functions
and structure of the Nicaraguan Central Bank, as well as the government's
control over the day-to-day operations of the central bank, and held that the
government did not display the type of5 excessive control over the central
bank to support an alter ego argument."
108 See id. at 630-32

(reasoning Cuban government would be beneficiary of courts'

recognition of Bancec's separate juridical identity). Bancec, as "'the principal beneficiary of any
recovery and itself estopped from complaining of petitioners' alleged wrongs, cannot avoid the
command of equity through the guise of proceeding in the name of... corporations which it
owns and controls."' Id. (quoting Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & A. R. Co., 417 U.S.
703, 713 (1974)).
109 See Hester Int'l Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 176 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989)
(distinguishing between agency in determining organ status and principal/agent relationship of
Bancec alter ego standard).
110 See Note, supra note 25, at 553 (noting absence of bright-line standard in alter ego
jurisprudence).
...See First Nat'l City Bank, 462 U.S. at 632 ("[O]ur decision today announces no
mechanical formula for determining the circumstances under which the normally separate
juridical status of a government instrumentality is to be disregarded."); see also Hester, 879 F.2d
at 179 ("[Djetermination of whether a government instrumentality is a separate juridical entity
involves the application of the law to fact-specific situations.").
112 See, e.g., De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 799 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding
national airline was not alter ego of Chilean government); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 720 F.
Supp. 2d 273, 301-302 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding central bank was alter ego of Argentine
government), vacated on other grounds sub nom., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la
Repiblica Arg., 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011); LNC Invs. Inc. v. Republic of Nicar., 115 F. Supp.
2d 358, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding central bank was not alter ego of Nicaraguan government).
113 115 F. Supp. 2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
114 Id. at 366 (holding Central Bank was not alter-ego of Nicaraguan government).
115 See id at 365-66 (reviewing functions of Nicaraguan Central Bank and its relationship to
Nicaraguan government).
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More recently, in EM Limited v. Republic of Argentina, 116 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled
that the assets of the Central Bank of Argentina lacked sufficient
independence to preserve the presumption of juridical separateness under
Bancec."7 The court found that after defaulting on its loans, Argentina's
government had concentrated power in the hands of the executive branch
and systematically took control of the Central Bank." 8
The court
concluded that by manipulating the bank's leadership, using the bank's
funds to repay the Republic's debts, and violating various provisions of the
Argentine constitution and the bank's charter, the government had
exhibited such disregard for the Central Bank's legal separation that it
should be deemed an alter ego of the government." 9
However, on appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's
attachment order. 20 While the Second Circuit accepted the lower court's
analysis of the alter ego relationship under Bancec, the court held that the
special protections of § 1611(b)(1) immunized central bank property
without regard to the central bank's independence from its parent state. 121
The court concluded that the funds in question were "held for the central
bank's own account"
and, therefore, absent an explicit waiver, immunized
122
from attachment.
116 720 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
117

See id. at 303-04 (holding Central Bank was alter ego of Argentine government).

118 See id. at 278-93 (illustrating Republic's influence and control over Central Bank).
119 See id. at 299-300.

The Republic ignored the mandate of BCRA's charter, which provided that
BCRA would not be subject to any order or instruction of the National
Executive in connection with the implementation of monetary and financial
policy. The management of BCRA posed no obstacles to the Republic's use
of the resources of BCRA exactly as the Republic wished. The Republic's
control in this regard was complete.
The court concludes that the
presumption of separateness is overcome, and that BCRA was the servant or
the agent of the Republic as to its funds, within the meaning of the Bancec

case.
Id. at 300.
120 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Repuiblica Arg., 652 F.3d 172, 197 (2d Cir.
2011) (vacating district court's attachment order).
121 See id. at 190 (holding central bank immunity under § 1611 (b)(1) unaffected by alter ego
analysis).
122 See id. at 195 (concluding central bank assets immune from attachment). The court held
that where central bank assets are used to perform traditionally-recognized central banking
functions, such assets are deemed to satisfy the "held for its own account" provision of
§ 1611(b)(1), and, therefore, immune from attachment. Id. at 193-94. The court concluded that
since the funds in question were being used to facilitate the regulation of the state currency, a
paradigmatic central bank function, those assets were immune from attachment. Id. at 195.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. FSIA Structural Confusions and Doctrinal Tensions
While motivated by the legitimate concern of avoiding the
diplomatic controversies that can arise when a foreign sovereign is subject
to U.S. judicial proceedings, the FSIA's current structure is problematic for
a number of reasons. 123 First, the commercial activities exception works
contrary to the public purpose test under the organ status analysis. 24 The
public purpose test asks the court to look at the purpose of the defendant's
conduct to determine whether it is an organ of a foreign state, only to have
the court later disregard that purpose and focus
on the nature of the conduct
125
under the commercial activities exception.
Likewise, the special treatment of central bank property under
§ 1611 (b) is at odds with the commercial activities exception. 1 26 This is
especially clear in light of the Weltover court's interpretation of
commercial activity. 2 7 Any central bank activity in the open market, such
as the management of investments or deposits, could lead the court to deem

a bank a "private player" rather than a market regulator under Weltover.128
Lower courts have widely followed this interpretation, exposing central
bank assets to attachment and execution, and thus annulling the effect of
any separate protections afforded under § 1611.129

123

See Robert B. von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.

L. 33, 48 (1978) (addressing structural problems resulting from failure to define
commercial activity).
1'24 See infra note 125 and accompanying text (explaining difference between analyses
undertaken by courts addressing organ status versus commercial activities exception).
125 See Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 808 (9th Cir. 2001) (focusing on
TRANSNAT'L

commercial activities), aff'd on other grounds, Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468
(2003); see also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 247 (2007) (Breyer,
J. and Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding corporate profits destined for public use essential
element in determining qualification under organ status). The organ status analysis focuses on
the intended purpose to be served by a defendant entity's actions, however, after qualifying for
immunity based on this purpose, the courts will disregard that purpose and strip the entity of its
immunity based solely on the nature of the acts. See Dole, 251 F.3d at 807 (analyzing organ
status test); see also Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (concluding
commercial activities test focuses on nature of act, to the exclusion of its purpose).
126 See Lee, supra note 84, at 373-74 (suggesting Weltover interpretation of commercial
activity exposes central bank foreign-exchange transactions to attachment and execution); see
also Note, supra note 25, at 556 (suggesting that Weltover interpretation of commercial activity
renders special protections under § 1611 "mere surplusage").
1'27 See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614 (describing test for determining commercial activities).
128 See sources cited supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing impact of Weltover
definition of commercial activity on central bank immunity).
129 See Ministry of Def. &Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v.
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Further complicating litigation under the FSLA, the Supreme
Court's decision in Dole seemingly ignored the statutory provisions for
organ status immunity. 130 As discussed above, the Supreme Court stated in
Dole that "[t]he statutory language will not support a control test that
mandates inquiry in every case into past details of a foreign nation's

relation to a corporate entity in which it does not own a majority of
shares.''
This holding supports the conclusion that direct majority
ownership is the exclusive means to agency or instrumentality status,
effectively rendering the statutes organ prong superfluous. 32 Following
Dole, application of the organ status prong has resulted in conflicting
opinions, adding to the confusion plaintiffs and practitioners face when
litigating claims under the FSIA. 133
Perhaps more fundamentally problematic is the contradiction found
between the simultaneous presumption of immunity and presumption of
separateness afforded to agencies and instrumentalities. 134 On the one
hand, the FSLA attributes the sovereign character of the parent government
to agencies and instrumentalities for the purpose of immunity; these
characteristics are the basis for establishing the presumption of

Cubic Def. Sys., Inc., 385 F.3d 1206, 1223 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding arbitral award obtained by
central bank was not exempt from attachment by judgment creditor), vacated and remandedsub
nom., Ministry of Def. & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elah,
546 U.S. 450 (2006). The Court stated, "The district courts that have considered the central bank
exemption so far have read it narrowly; in some cases, the exemption has been found not to apply
even where the funds unquestionably belonged to the foreign state's central bank." Id. at 1223
n.21. Since the arbitral award was not used or held in connection with central banking activities,
it was not exempt from attachment or execution. Id. at 1223-24.
130 See supra notes 58-59, 61 and accompanying text (discussing impact of Dole on organ

status).
131
132

Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 477 (2003).
See supra notes 58, 61 and accompanying text (interpreting Dole to limit immunity status

to ownership analysis).
133 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (citing conflicting interpretations of impact of
Dole on agency instrumentality status analysis).
134 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 577-78 (discussing inconsistency between FSIA standards
for immunity and liability).
For immunity purposes, section 1603(b) provides that a state-owned entity is
an "instrumentality" of the foreign state, and treats the entity largely as if it
were the state itself. But for liability purposes, the same entity invariably
claims that it is "separate" from the state to such a degree that it should not
be identified with the state. Ultimately, section 1603(b) can allow stateowned entities to enjoy the benefits of foreign state status as well as the
benefits of "separate entity" status without imposing the risks implicit in
instrumentality status.
Id. at 578 (footnotes omitted).
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immunity.135 On the other hand, the same foreign corporations retain their

separate legal status for purposes of liability, thus avoiding liability 3for
6 the
acts of the parent government despite their sovereign characteristics.1
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was originally created to apply
to the foreign state itself and not her commercial subsidiaries. 37
Conversely, the limited liability doctrine of corporate separateness was
established to benefit private companies and individuals seeking to
compete in the marketplace without being held liable for the obligations of
their separate corporations. 38 This doctrine is supported by the economic
gains associated with its promotion of investment, entrepreneurship, and
generally greater market growth. 3 9 However, the FSIA's broad definition

of foreign state has encouraged foreign sovereigns to structure their
commercial operations through legally separate entities that enjoy a level of
immunity similar to that of the foreign state proper. 1 40 The Supreme Court
in Bancec made a strong case for the utility and societal benefits that
foreign sovereigns can derive from the corporate structure, stating:
Increasingly during this century, governments
throughout the world have established separately
constituted legal entities .... [permitting them] to manage
their operations on an enterprise basis while granting them
a greater degree of flexibility and independence from close
political control ....
[and] obtain the financial resources

135 See

Lee, supra note 84, at 360 (discussing how FSIA permits agencies and

instrumentalities to enjoy "dual identities"). Due to the Act's divergent treatment of immunity
and liability, agencies and instrumentalities can assume one identity for the purpose of immunity
from jurisdiction and another for immunity from liability. Id.
116 See id (discussing effects of dual identities under FSIA).
137 See supra Part II.A (discussing origins of doctrine of sovereign immunity in U.S. courts);
see also Riblett, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing historical application of sovereign immunity).
138 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 18 ("[H]istorically [the doctrine of corporate
separateness] ... applied to traditional companies and individuals who seek to compete in the
marketplace.").
139 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 495
(2001) ("[T]here is a widely shared view that limited liability was, and remains, essential to
attracting enormous amount of investment capital necessary for industrial corporations to arise
and flourish."); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 90-98 (1985) (discussing economic and legal benefits attributed to
doctrine of limited liability); Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated
Industries, 2008 BYU L. REv. 1165, 1166 (2008) (noting significant economic benefits
associated with doctrine of limited liability).
140 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 18 (discussing increasing use of corporate structure by
foreign government to avoid liability for commercial activities).
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needed to make large-scale national investments. 141
Nonetheless, the benefits attributed to a sovereign's utilization of
separate corporate entities are founded on the doctrine of limited liability
and not on the notion that such entities, as market participants, must be
afforded immunities on par with the state itself' 142 That an entity can
qualify for both immunity, which is a fundamentally sovereign trait, and
corporate separateness, which is a fundamentally private trait, creates
discord in the law. 143 This discord is due to the fact that the analysis for
agency or instrumentality status and the alter44ego status required for veil
piercing are based on two different standards. 1
As discussed in greater detail above, the degree of sovereign
association required for qualification for immunity protections under the
organ prong of the FSIA's agency and instrumentality status is relatively
simple to achieve. 45 Essentially, an entity need only demonstrate that it
serves some public purpose and that the state exerts some reasonable
amount of control over its operation. 46 However, to satisfy the Bancec
standard for alter ego veil piercing, the control exercised by the state must
be so significant so as to rise to the level of day-to-day operational
141 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 624-25

(1983).
142 See id. In its discussion of the utility of corporate structure to government function and
the economic and legal benefits of corporate separateness, the Court never suggests a need for
immunization of such corporate bodies. Id. On the contrary, the Court focuses on the need to
distinguish the subsidiary corporation from its parent government. Id. at 625-26; see also Riblett,
supra note 7, at 18-19 (demonstrating that commentators do not view immunity as requisite for
economic benefits from limited liability).
143 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 577-78 (discussing inconsistency between FSIA standards
for immunity and liability); see also Riblett, supra note 7, at 19 (discussing tension between
Bancec alter-ego standard and qualification for immunity under organ standard).
144 See Hester Int'l Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 879 F.2d 170, 176 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989)
The use of the single term "agency" for two purposes ... may cause some confusion. The FSIA
uses it to determine whether an "agency" of the state may potentially qualify for foreign
sovereign immunity itself under the FSIA. This is a completely different question from [the
Bancec alter-ego analysis] ....
Although such an alter ego relationship may be described in
terms of "agency," it is a completely different inquiry than that which might be conducted under
§ 1603 ....
[T]he level of state control required to establish an "alter ego" relationship is more
extensive than that required to establish FSIA "agency."

Id.
145 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing qualification for presumption of immunity under FSIA);
see also Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 F.3d 795, 807 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding performance of
public activity on behalf of foreign government sufficient to establish organ status).
146 See Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir. 2004) (performing traditionally

governmental functions and having operations overseen by government sufficient to prove organ
status); see also Riblett, supra note 7, at 19 (noting low evidentiary requirements for establishing
organ status).
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control. 147 Therefore, it is possible for commercial entities and their
sovereign parents to enjoy
the dual protections of corporate separateness
48
and sovereign immunity. 1
Despite the fact that the activities in which these entities engage are
essentially commercial in nature, the FSIA permits them to masquerade in
the marketplace and compete with their non-state counterparts while

retaining the benefit of presumed immunity.149 The benefits of such a
presumption of immunity are extensive and create an unjust imbalance
between the plaintiff and the sovereign defendant, arguably constituting the
most significant problem with the current structure of the FSIA. 50
B. The Presumption ofImmunity Leads to a DisadvantagedPlaintiff
The FSIA is structured to provide a broad presumption of

sovereign immunity to a variety of potential defendants."i' Once an entity
qualifies for the presumption of immunity, the burden of proof then shifts

to the plaintiff to invoke a statutory exception to rebut immunity. 152 While
the commercial activities exception allows litigants to seek legal redress in
disputes arising out of their commercial transactions, the sovereign
defendant's mantel of immunity does not drop off before conferring many
inequitable protections and procedural advantages upon the sovereign
3
defendant. 15
Plaintiffs are disadvantaged because they are often unaware that
the corporation with whom they are contracting may be entitled to
immunity. 154 Foreign shareholder identities are often unavailable to
business partners, and corporate names provide little indication as to the

147 See Gabay v. Mostazafan Found. of Iran, 968 F. Supp. 895, 899 (S.D.N.Y.

1997)

(affirming alter-ego relationship depends on level of "control over the day-to-day activities" of
entity); see also Hester, 879 F.2d at 176 n.5 ("[T]he level of state control required to establish an
'alter ego' relationship is more extensive than that required to establish FSIA [organ status]").
148 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 19-23 (discussing potential for dual protections of sovereign
immunity and limited liability); see also Hoffman, supra note 24, at 577 (discussing how stateowned entities can benefit from inconsistency between standards for immunity and liability).
149 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 569-71 (discussing unfair surprise plaintiffs face when
commercial counterpart's sovereign identity is revealed and immunity attaches).
150 See infra Part II.B; see also Hoffman, supra note 24, at 571-74 (discussing procedural
benefits that follow presumption of immunity).
151 See supra Part II.B. 1 (discussing FSIA structure and presumption of immunity).
152 See Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing
procedural implications for litigating claims under FSIA).
153 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 571-74 (analyzing procedural consequences for plaintiffs
litigating under FSIA).
154 Id.at 569-71 (discussing sovereign's "hidden identity").
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presence of either sovereign shareholders or potential organ status.155
Moreover, as Justice Breyer indicated in Powerex, qualification for organ

status may be dependent on factors that are not apparent to plaintiffs at the
outset of the agreement, such as the level of government influence in

corporate affairs or the destination or use of profits derived from corporate
transactions. 56
Parties unaware that their business counterpart may be immune
from suit or possess sheltered assets are unable to take precautionary steps
to protect themselves. 157 With prior knowledge that their business
counterpart may qualify for immunity, a party could proactively protect
themselves by securing waivers of immunity in their contracts or generally
ensuring that the transaction satisfies one of the FSIA exceptions.158 Often,
plaintiffs only come to learn of their counterpart's sovereign identity after
* 159
litigation has already commenced, constituting unfair surprise.
Similarly, the presumption of immunity that attaches to foreign

state status, and the application of the FSIA that then follows, creates a
number of procedural disadvantages for plaintiffs litigating under the
FSIA. 160 The FSIA provides special rules for service of process and, more
importantly, requires specific rules for service of agencies and
instrumentalities. 161 A plaintiff without advanced knowledge as to which
rules apply to their counterpart runs the risk of dismissal for
noncompliance. 162 Likewise, because the FSIA expressly forecloses the
right to jury trial, the potentially vitiating effect on the plaintiff's traditional

155

Id. at 570 n.171 (citing examples of foreign corporations concealing entitlement to special

treatment under FSIA).
156 See Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 245 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (concluding corporate profits destined for public use was essential element in
determining organ status).
157 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 569-71 (discussing inequitable effects resulting from
sovereign's hidden identity).
158 See id at 570-71 (discussing protective measures available to parties with prior
knowledge of potential for immunity claims).
159 See Geveke & Co. Int'l, Inc. v. Kompania Di Awa I Elektrisidat Di Korsou, N.V., 482 F.
Supp. 660, 661 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (demonstrating counsel for foreign corporation was surprised
to realize its client qualified for immunity).
160 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 571 (discussing procedural consequences of "foreign
state" status).
161 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b) (2006) (stating agencies or instrumentalities may be served
directly by mail), with § 1608(a) (stating service by mail made against foreign states must be
made through diplomatic channels).
162 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 571 (explaining significance of noncompliance);
see also
LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1400, 1411-14 (E.D. Va. 1988) (demonstrating plaintiff's
non-compliance with § 1608 fatal to claim).
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rights and remedies under state and federal laws is immediately apparent. 1
Further frustrating a plaintiffs litigation, the FSIA entitles foreign
164
states and their agencies and instrumentalities to special removal rights.
Unlike the thirty-day limit found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the FSIA's foreign state status empowers sovereign defendants to enlarge
this removal period "for cause shown," arguably authorizing foreign states
to indefinitely delay their removal petition. 165 Most importantly, however,
the FSIA's removal provisions empower foreign states and their agencies
and instrumentalities with the absolute right to remove any civil action to

the federal courts regardless of the jurisdictional basis for suit against the
other parties involved. 66 Thus, the presumption of immunity, from which
these removal powers flow, impedes on the plaintiff's choice of forum,
increases the cost of litigation, and produces an inequitable balance of
167
power.
Moreover, the FSIA's restrictions on prejudgment attachment and
execution provide sovereign defendants with significant tools for avoiding

and otherwise frustrating a plaintiffs ability to enforce successful
judgments. 168 While the general exception to immunity from execution
under § 1610(a) permits attachment in aid of execution by way of either a
waiver or application of the commercial activities exception, § 1610(d)
163 See § 1330(a) (restricting jurisdiction to "nonjury civil action"); FED. R. Civ.
P. 38

(explaining right to jury trial and procedures for jury trial demand); see also Bailey v. Grand
Trunk Lines New Eng., 805 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (2d. Cir. 1986) (confirming FSIA precludes trial
by jury against instrumentality of foreign state).
164 See § 1441(d) (discussing special removal rights available in actions involving foreign
states). Compare § 1441(b) (diversity jurisdiction), with § 1441(c) (federal question jurisdiction).
165 Compare § 1446(b) ("The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed
within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the
initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or
within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then
been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is
shorter."), with § 1441(d) ("[T]he time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chapter may be
enlarged at any time for cause shown."). See also Hoffman, supra note 24, at 571-72 (discussing
potential for FSIA's enlarged removal period to delay litigation). But see Dehart v. A.C. & S.,
Inc., 682 F. Supp. 792, 794-95 (D. Del. 1988) (holding removal petition on foreign
instrumentality grounds filed over four years after service was untimely).
166 See § 1441(d) ("Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state
as defined
in section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.");
see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Pendent Party Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 71, 116-23 (1998) (exploring scope of removal jurisdiction
under FSIA).
167 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 572 (addressing expenses associated with litigating
against qualified entities and interference with plaintiff s choice of forum).
168 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 28 (suggesting most important advantage for qualified foreign
states is ability to resist attachment or execution).
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provides a much more difficult standard for the exception to immunity
from prejudgment attachment. 169 Under § 1610(d), a plaintiff may only
utilize prejudgment attachment to secure satisfaction of a judgment as
opposed to obtain jurisdiction. 170
More importantly, prejudgment
attachment requires that the plaintiff not only satisfy the commercial
171
activities exception of § 1610(a), but also obtain a valid waiver.
Satisfying all three elements and invoking the exception to immunity for
prejudgment attachment is an exceedingly difficult task, especially in light
of the fact that the sovereign identity of the172
defendant is often hidden from
litigation.
commencing
to
prior
the plaintiff
The ability to secure assets by way of attachment and execution is
essential to a plaintiffs ability to enforce their claim. 173 However, the
plaintiff's disadvantage and the importance of attachment and execution
under the FSIA becomes all the more significant in light of the grace period
afforded under § 1610(c). 174 The § 1610(c) grace period provides that,
following an entry of judgment, parties are prevented from attaching or
executing against assets in satisfaction of their judgment until the court has
determined that a reasonable amount of time has elapsed. 175 The impact of

169
170
171
172

Compare § 1610(a), with § 1610(d).
See § 1610(d)(2).
See § 1610(d)(1).
See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing surprise plaintiffs experience when

counterparties qualify for immunity).
173 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing importance of attachment and
execution measures to litigation under FSIA). Without attachment and measures of execution, a
plaintiff must rely entirely on the foreign government's voluntary compliance with the judgment.
Id; see also EM Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 720 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(illustrating Argentina's immunity from attachment and execution to avoid satisfying judgments),
vacated on othergrounds sub nom., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Republica de Arg.,
652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011). Judge Thomas Griesa seemingly took offense to Argentina's
continued efforts to avoid compliance with the courts judgment awards, stating:
It is true that the Republic has duly consented to the jurisdiction of the
federal court in New York City, and has been reasonably cooperative in
litigation leading to the entry of many judgments against the Republic based
on defaulted bonds. However, as it turns out, this has all been largely pro
forma. As we know, judgments are worthless without the ability to enforce
them. Despite the commitment in the bonds that there could be judgments
which "may be enforced," the Republic has done everything in its power to
prevent such enforcement.
ld.
174

See Riblett, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing critical importance of grace period under

§ 1610(c)).
175 § 16 10(c) ("No attachment or execution.., shall be permitted until the court has ordered
such attachment and execution after having determined that a reasonable period of time has
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such a delay can frustrate attachment entirely, as it will often provide the

foreign state, or its agencies and instrumentalities, with sufficient time to
transfer or otherwise shield
any susceptible assets following the entry of a
76
judgment against them. 1
IV. REFORM PROPOSALS
No other international jurisdiction affords legally separate entities
presumptive immunity.1 77 Rather, most nations have expressly rejected this
notion, instead relying on the separate entity rule to determine the legal
status of corporate bodies and limiting the attachment of immunity status
for legally separate entities to sovereign acts.17 8 Thus, the presumption of
immunity under § 1603 runs directly contrary to the modern international
practice for conferring sovereign immunity. 179 In this sense, the current
structure of the FSIA does not achieve its purpose of promoting comity, a
fundamental principle of sovereign immunity.' 80
Likewise, under the
current framework, the presumptive immunity afforded to legally separate
entities under the agency and instrumentalities provision of § 1603(b) is
inconsistent with the rationale of restrictive immunity, in that it provides
immunity protections to entities engaged in commercial activity.""

elapsed following the entry of judgment and the giving of any notice required under section
1608(e) of this chapter."). Although the FSIA does not define the term "reasonable period of
time," lower courts have generously withheld from granting motions for declarations of
"reasonable period of time" for anywhere from thirty days to two months. See FG Hemisphere
Assocs. v. Republique du Congo, No. 01 Civ.8700SASHBP, 2005 WL 545218, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 8, 2005) (concluding thirty days was reasonable period of time); Gadsby & Hannah v.
Socialist Republic of Rom., 698 F. Supp. 483, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (concluding two months was
reasonable period of time).
176 See Riblett, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing ability of foreign states to utilize § 1610(c)
grace period to move assets after judgment).
177 See Hoffman supra note 24, at 551-65 (comparing divergent international approaches to
sovereign immunity); see also Sunil R. Harjani, Comment, Litigating Claims over Foreign
Government-Owned Corporations Under the Commercial Activities Exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 181, 184 (1999) (noting U.S. is only
jurisdiction to recognize state-ownership as conferring immunity to separate entities).
178 See Hoffman- supra note 24, at 542-64 (discussing predominance of separate entity rule in
international jurisdictions).
179 See id. at 565 n.149 ("[T]he 1603(b)(2) 'majority ownership interest' clause has no
support in international law and virtually none in pre-FSIA American law.").
180 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (noting foreign
sovereign immunity is matter of grace and comity, not restriction imposed by Constitution); see
also Republic of Phil. v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 853 ("[ljmportant comity concerns are
implicated by assertion of foreign sovereign immunity.").
181 See Hrjaini, supra note 177, at 200 ("[E]ven the initial grant of sovereign immunity to a
[state-owned entity], which by nature, as a corporation, is almost always engaged in commercial
activities, runs contrary to the very purpose of restrictive sovereign immunity.").
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Congress should amend the definition of "foreign state" under
§ 1603 to exclude agencies and instrumentalities, and in its place, utilize
the separate entity rule for determining sovereign status of legally separate
entities. 1812 However, in recognition of the valid need to provide
presumptive protections for certain organizations and governmental
systems, the statutory definition of "foreign state" should specifically
include departments and ministries of government, government funded
independent regulatory bodies serving principally public functions, foreign
central banks, and armed services. 8 3
Application of the separate entity rule would deny legally separate
entities the protections of the FSIA unless and until the corporate defendant
shows that the claim arises out of an activity that was sovereign in
nature.184 The separate entity rule's exception permits those entities in fact
engaged in sovereign activity to retain the ability to assert the sovereign
immunity defense, while greatly reducing the inequitable and unexpected
effects resulting from the application of § 1603's presumptive immunity.18 5
A second area in need of reform lies in the FSIA's treatment of
immunity from execution. 18 6 Codified in § 1610 generally, and § 1611's
property-specific exclusions, the FSIA's provisions relating to immunity
from execution are structurally daunting and ineffective. 18 7 In particular,
confusion arises from the fact that the FSIA distinguishes between
immunity from jurisdiction and immunity from execution. 'RRAlthough it is
generally recognized that a nation's authority to exercise jurisdiction to
adjudicate may be distinct from its authority to exercise jurisdiction to
enforce, there exists no need for the court to base its jurisdictional analyses

182

See supra Part III.B (discussing plaintiff's procedural disadvantages due to presumption

of immunity); see also Hoffman, supra note 24, at 583-84 (explaining superiority of separate
entity rule to § 1603 (b) as device for conferring protections of FSIA).
183 See Granne, supra note 55, at 17 (discussing need for flexible agency and instrumentality
definition that encompassed various organizations and government systems); see also Riblett,
supra note 7, at 38 (proposing to replace agency/instrumentality provision of "foreign state"
definition with enumerated government entities serving public purposes); Am. Bar Ass'n
Working Grp., supra note 91, at 541-43 (proposing reforms to FSIA definition of "foreign state").
184 See Hoffman, supra note 24, at 581 (discussing advantages of separate entity rule and
noting application would shift initial burden to defendant).
15 See id. at 584 (lauding benefits of separate entity rule). The separate entity rule would
permit "those entities truly engaged in sovereign activity to successfully assert the defense of
sovereign immunity without the unfair and unexpected consequences of § 1603(b)"). Id.
186 See Am. Bar Ass'n Working Grp., supra note 91, at 581 (recognizing need
to reform
FSIA's provisions relating to immunity from execution).
187 See id. (describing FSIA execution immunity provisions "as among the most confusing
and ineffectual in the statute.").
188 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing statutory distinction between jurisdictional immunity
and immunity from attachment and execution).
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on different standards. 189 Nonetheless, the FSIA prescribes divergent
approaches for immunity from jurisdiction and execution, and this
inconsistency adds substantial complexity and confusion to the courts
adjudication of claims and restrains successful plaintiffs in their efforts to
enforce their judgments.' 90
Congress should amend § 1610 to create greater harmony in the
treatment of jurisdictional immunity and immunity from execution. 191 To
this end, the above proposals relating to the elimination of agencies and
instrumentalities from the definition of foreign state under § 1603 would
further reduce structural confusion by obviating the need for § 1610(b)'s

divergent

treatment

instrumentalities. 9 2

of measures

of execution

for agencies

and

Similarly, the statute should be amended so as to

eliminate the need to obtain both a waiver from jurisdiction and a waiver
from execution. 193 As currently written, a contracting party must obtain
separate waivers of immunity from jurisdiction and execution. 194 By
eliminating this distinction, Congress could simplify the court's analysis of
jurisdictional immunity and immunity from execution while reducing the
uncertainly for contracting parties with regards to the effectiveness of their

waivers.

195

Finally, Congress should eliminate the nexus requirement found in

189

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 401

cmt. a (1987).
The limitations on a state's authority to subject foreign interests or activities
to its laws differ from those that govern the state's jurisdiction to adjudicate,
and the limitations on a state's authority to enforce its law through
administrative, executive, or police action differ in some respects from those
that apply to enforcement through its courts.
Id.

190See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (citing criticism of FSIA's provisions

relating to immunity from execution).
191 See Am. Bar Ass'n Working Grp., supra note 91, at 583 (advocating greater harmony
between jurisdictional immunity and immunity from attachment and execution).
192 See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (arguing that eliminating agency and
instrumentality provisions would align analysis for immunity issues).
193 See Am. Bar Ass'n Working Grp., supra note 91, at 550 (proposing to amend FSIA to
permit parties to rely on universal waiver of immunity).
194 See id. at 584 (interpreting FSIA as requiring individual and separate waivers of immunity
from jurisdiction, attachment, and execution). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2006).
195 See Am. Bar Ass'n Working Grp., supra note 91, at 583-84 (identifying need to reform
and harmonize FSIA waiver provisions); see also Hoffman, supra note 24, at 570-71 (discussing

FSIA's propensity for confusion and inequitable effects arising from hidden identify of sovereign
defendant).
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§ 1610(a)(2).

96

In its current form, the FSIA limits the property available
for execution or attachment in claims against the foreign state itself to
property used for a commercial activity in the United States that has
additionally been "used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is
based.' 97 The situs requirement itself eliminates significant properties that
may potentially be used to satisfy a claim. 19" However, the nexus
requirement poses the greatest difficulty for a plaintiff because it is rare,
especially in breach of contract claims, that a foreign state will have any
property "used" for the activity giving rise to the claim, much less in the
United States. 199 Considering that such commercial claims have come to
dominate litigation under the FSIA, plaintiffs commonly find themselves
with a right without a remedy.200 Eliminating the nexus requirement would
provide plaintiffs with additional property to satisfy successful judgments
against sovereign defendants, further harmonize the FSIA's treatment of
immunity from jurisdiction and execution, and reduce the plaintiff s futile
reliance on a foreign sovereign's voluntary compliance with adverse
judgments 201
V. CONCLUSION
Much has changed on both the political and economic fronts since
the enactment of the FSIA. In light of globalization and progressive
government structure, today's marketplaces are increasingly populated by
state-owned corporations engaged in commercial conduct with private
parties in a way Congress could have never anticipated thirty years ago.

196

See § 1610(a)(2) (limiting execution and attachment to property used in United States

giving rise to claim).
197 id.
198 See Am. Bar Ass'n Working Grp., supra note 91, at 584 ("Several factors combine to
make execution against foreign states extremely restrictive. First is the threshold requirement in
section 1610(a) that the property against which attachment in aid of execution or execution is
sought must be 'used for a commercial activity in the United States.' At the outset, this
eliminates large classes of property that might be candidates for execution in satisfaction of a
judgment against a foreign sovereign.").
199 See De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 798-799 (2d. Cir 1984)
(demonstrating difficulty plaintiffs face in finding attachable assets to satisfy judgments against
foreign states); see also Am. Bar Ass'n Working Grp., supra note 91, at 584 (illustrating limited
examples of when foreign state may possess property satisfying § 1610(a)(2) nexus requirement).
200 See Am. Bar Ass'n Working Grp., supra note 91, at 585 (explaining predominance of
cases concerning commercial activities exception in litigation under FSIA); see also De Letelier,
748 F.2d at 799 (stating FSIA can leave plaintiffs with "a right without a remedy").
201 See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text (demonstrating significance of FSIA's
current restrictions on execution); see also De Letelier, 748 F.2d at 799 n.4 (describing plaintiff's
remedy as "tenuous" reliance on "act of international good-will to honor the judgment").
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Given the great power and influence that accompanies state ownership and
sponsorship, particularly financial and political support, it seems neither
necessary nor appropriate that such sovereign entities be afforded the
additional benefit of presumed immunity. Furthermore, the FSIA in its
current construction is procedurally awkward and the jurisprudence that has
evolved around its application is often conflicting. For these reasons the
FSIA should be revised. The implementation of the amendments proposed
in this Note would provide greater certainty in the courts, greater harmony
with other international jurisdictions, and strike a greater balance of power
between plaintiffs and sovereign defendants.
Matthew Engellenner
*This Note is dedicated to my father, my mentor and my
hero.

